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Abstract: A reflective style of ruminative response to negative mood, as opposed to a 
brooding style, is linked to creativity (Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Aikman, 2014), 
especially when indecision is high (Cohen & Ferrari, 2010).  In order to examine 
potential links between creativity and styles of ruminative response to positive mood 
(Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, 2007), I adapted the Ruminative Responses Scale 
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991)—a widely used measure of negative mood 
responses—to address positive mood responses (Positive Rumination Scale; PRS).  
Following tenets of psychological self-distance theory (Ayduk and Kross, 2008), I 
characterized Reflection and Brooding styles of negative mood response on the RRS as 
self-distant and self-immersed, respectively, and I characterized Interpreting and Basking 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996) styles of positive mood response on the PRS as self-distant and 
self-immersed, respectively.  Whereas previous researchers found that a self-distanced 
response to negative mood predicts creativity, only a self-immersed response to positive 
mood predicted creativity when indecision was high in the present sample.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLE MANUSCRIPT 
 
 
 
Friederich Nietzsche (1889/1977) described emotion as an essential source of creative 
energy, noting that “if there is to be any aesthetic doing and seeing, one condition is 
indispensable: frenzy” (p. 517).  Creative writers and artists have often described their 
frenzy in in gloomy terms.  In a letter to his wife, Francis Scott Fitzgerald (1940/2002) 
remarked upon his curious loss of creative ability in the absence of sadness:  “It’s odd 
that my old talent for the short story vanished.  ...Part of it was somehow tied up with you 
and me—the happy ending” (p. 373).  The dark side of creativity (Akinola & Mendes, 
2008; Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010) is supported by research indicating 
greater incidences of mood disorders (Andreasen, 1987; Jamison, 1993; Ludwig 1995; 
Kaufman, 2001; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Kahn, 2005), psychoticism (Eysenck, 1993), 
distractibility (Takeuchi et al., 2011), substance abuse, suicide (Ludwig, 1994), negative 
personality traits or tendencies such as narcissism (Feist, 1998), and dishonesty (Silvia, 
Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, Wigert, 2011) among highly creative people.  A few theorists 
have attributed these higher incidences to factors extrinsic to the creative process or
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person (Rhodes, 1961) by speculating that creative professionals may be depressed 
because they tend to have less money, social support, and prestige (Weisberg, 2006) or 
because they believe, like Fitzgerald, they must fulfill a tortured stereotype to be 
successful (Kaufman, Bromley, & Cole, 2006; Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004).   
Negative Mood and Creativity 
 Kaufman and Baer (2002) speculated that poets suffer higher rates of depression 
because heightened sensitivity to negative emotions is characteristic of literary works 
(Olsen, 1998) and disordered thinking among people with depressive symptomology 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999).  Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues 
labeled this sort of disordered thinking   (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008) depressive rumination and defined it as “a mode of responding to distress that 
involves repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible 
causes and consequences of these symptoms”	  (p. 400).  According to response styles 
theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987), people are more likely to become depressed if 
they passively focus on the self when responding to negative moods.  Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow’s (1991) Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), a measure of ruminative 
response to negative mood, was later revised to include reflection and brooding 
rumination styles (Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  Based on their 
analysis of RRS items, Treynor and her colleagues described the Reflection factor as 
suggestive of  “purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to 
alleviate one’s depressive symptoms,”	  and they described the Brooding factor as 
suggestive of “passive comparison of one’s current situation with some unachieved 
standard”	  (p. 256).  They called for future theoretical refinement to account for these 
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rumination style differences.  Since the terms brooding and reflection for rumination 
styles represent a conflation of emotion and cognition, an underlying cognitive construct 
is needed in order for theorists to disentangle the links between them. 
  Brooding and Reflection styles have differentially predicted creativity in a few 
studies.  Verhaeghen, Joormann, and Khan (2005) found that greater Reflection scores 
were related to past and current depressive symptomology, creative interest, and creative 
fluency, originality, and elaboration. Since they found no direct link between current or 
past depressive symptomology and creativity, the authors concluded that rumination 
accounted for the relationship.  In a follow-up to this study inclusive of Brooding scores, 
Verhaeghen, Joormann, and Aikman (2014) found that Brooding was linked only with 
dysphoria while Reflection was only linked with creativity.  Cohen and Ferrari (2010) 
found that greater Reflection scores predicted greater creativity scores on the Runco 
Ideational Behavior Scale (Runco, Plucker, & Lim, 2001), especially in the presence of 
greater indecision scores on Mann’s (1982) Decisional Procrastination Scale (DP).  RST 
does not yet account for how a reflective style facilitates creativity or if similar processes 
are present when people ruminate in response to positive moods. 
Positive Mood and Creativity 
Although there are few research studies on positive rumination (Feldman, 
Joormann, & Johnson, 2007), psychological accounts from other lines of inquiry into 
mood and creativity are not always so dark.  A brighter side of creativity is characterized 
by social savvy (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991) and positive mood (Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 2004; Isen, 2008).  Several experimental studies have demonstrated beneficial 
effects for induced positive moods on creativity indicators such as increased cognitive 
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flexibility (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Murray, Sujan, 
Hirt, & Sujan, 1990; Mumford, 2003).  Bright side advocates also attend to positive 
correlations between creative production and likeable personality traits such as Openness 
to Experience (Strong et al., 2007).  Findings from investigations such as these led Isen 
(2008) to conclude that positive moods prompt greater “creative problem solving and 
innovation, as well as both efficiency and thoroughness in decision making 
and…improved thinking, especially where tasks are complex”	  (p. 549).   
Theorists have attributed mixed mood-creativity findings to different creativity 
outcomes measures, to the activation or arousal level of mood states, and to the time at 
which mood effects are measured (Akinola & Mendes, 2008; De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 
2008).  Concerning outcome measures, reasearchers have demonstrated greater cognitive 
flexibility when people experience positive mood (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 2004) and 
greater originality when people experience negative mood  (Rietzschel, Nijstad, & 
Stroebe, 2007). Concerning activation-states, De Dreu,  Baas, and Nijstad (2008) found 
that activating positive and negative mood states (e.g., “angry, fearful, happy, elated”) 
predicted creative fluency and originality while deactivating mood states (e.g., “sad, 
depressed, relaxed, serene”) did not (p. 739).  They used these results to support their dual 
pathway to creativity model, a central tenet of which is that positive and negative moods 
facilitate creativity through different pathways.  Concerning time course, researchers 
have demonstrated early adaptive effects for positive mood and later adaptive effects for 
negative mood (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 2002).  RST accounts for whether a negative 
mood state is likely to become activating or deactivating over time since RST explains 
depressive symptoms as a consequence of passive self-focus.  And although RST was 
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originally intended to predict risk for depressive episode relapses, increased theoretical 
focus on cognitive processes that facilitate activation states may help RST researchers 
more accurately predict the likelihood of future activation states for positive mood, as 
well. 
Psychological Self-Distance 
While previous researchers characterized rumination styles according to 
differences in attention (i.e., self-focus for Brooding versus problem-solving focus for 
Reflection) and activation (i.e., passive Brooding versus active Reflection; Treynor et al., 
2003), a construal level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010) account of psychological 
self-distance provides a novel way of generalizing rumination style differences within 
and between mood valences in a way that maintains interdependent links rather than 
conflations between mood and cognition.  Psychological self-distance may denote 
imagined or real distance between self and objects or other people (social distance) in 
time (temporal distance), or space (spatial distance).  High-level construals are 
considered psychologically self-distant because abstract ideas do not call to mind specific 
people, times, or locations.  In contrast, low-level construals are considered self-
immersed because they are concrete and call to mind particular people, times, or 
locations.  According to CLT, psychological distances in one domain are likely to elicit 
similar distances in other domains.  In their illustration, Trope and Liberman (2010) used 
the idea of “having fun”	  as a high-level construal and “playing basketball outside”	  as a 
low-level construal (p. 442).  Because the thought “playing basketball outside”	  is more 
likely to bring to mind specific locations and people with whom one might play, it is 
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more likely to induce thoughts that are psychologically close such as a specific basketball 
courtyard in one’s own neighborhood and friends who live nearby.  
  Ayduk and Kross (2010) induced a self-distanced perspective by instructing 
participants to imaginatively re-experience an emotionally distressing event from the 
perspective of a “fly on a wall”	  in contrast to a self-immersed, or first-person perspective 
(p. 809).  They found that a self-distanced perspective was associated with less emotional 
reactivity, as measured by cardiovascular activity and self-report, immediately after 
participants imagined a distressing event and up to seven weeks later.  Kross and Ayduk 
(2008) found that participants who focused on negative memories from a self-distanced 
perspective were more likely to make meaning of their negative experiences while 
participants who focused on negative memories from self-immersed perspective were 
more likely to recount negative experiences.  
Spatially oriented psychological distance accounts between self and object are 
similar to some qualitative researchers’ descriptions of the artistic, creative process.  For 
example, Reinders	  (1991) used the term distance-engagement paradox to denote a 
common feeling among artists that the creative process is characterized by a pattern of 
alternation between feelings of distance versus engagement with creative products.  In 
their phenomenological investigation of artists’	  experience of the creative process, Nelson 
and Rawlings (2007) described an engaged, “intuitive”	  stage, characterized by 
“momentum, pleasure, and ease,” and a subsequent, distanced “draining”	  stage where 
artists consider their artwork’s relevance and meaning (p. 235). The distance-engagement 
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or distance-immersion characterization is akin to authors’ maxim to “write drunk, edit 
sober”	  (DeVries, 1964).   
Purpose and Hypotheses 
In the present investigation, I addressed the lack of research on ruminative 
response to positive mood and need for RST refinement in light of rumination style 
differences within and across mood states.  In order to extend RST beyond negative 
mood responses, I characterized ruminative mood responses as a function of self-distance 
(self-immersed versus self-distant) for both positive and negative mood states (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2010).  I refered to a reflective rumination style as a self-distanced mode of 
response since this style has been described as an active, problem-solving approach that 
predicts reduced emotional responsiveness.  I refered to a brooding rumination style as a 
self-immersed mode of response since this style has been described as a passive, self-
focused response that predicts increased emotional responsiveness (Treynor et al., 2003).  
The self-distance construct clarifies style differences as a function of a cognitive process 
while previous terms for rumination styles like brooding, for instance, conflate mood and 
cognition rather than explaining how a brooding style is mutually exclusive from and 
interdependent with mood.     
In addition to offering a theoretical clarification of RST by synthesizing theories 
of rumination and psychological distance, I tested negative and positive ruminative 
response style influences on creativity as a function of self-distant and self-immersed 
psychological distances as well as moderating effects of indecision. I replicated Cohen 
and Ferrari’s (2010) moderation analysis in order to test the first hypothesis that a 
reflective (self-distant) style of negative rumination would predict creativity in the 
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presence of high levels of indecision.  I explored interpreting (self-distant) versus basking 
(self-immersed) positive rumination styles to test the second hypothesis that a self-
immersed style of positive rumination would predict creativity in the presence of low 
amounts of indecision.  Martin and Tesser (1996) originally introduced basking as a way 
of ruminatively responding to positive moods.  The second hypothesis was informed by 
the dual-pathway to creativity model (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008).  De Dreu and his 
colleagues argue that creativity is facilitated by positive and negative moods through 
different pathways.  Failure to demonstrate greater creativity for a self-immersed style of 
positive rumination would provide disconfirming evidence of the dual-pathway to 
creativity model in terms of psychological distance.  On the other hand, a demonstration 
of facilitative effects for a self-immersed positive rumination style would add knowledge 
to exploratory body of work on positive rumination, and it would support use of the dual-
pathway to creativity model and construal-level theory in characterizations of rumination 
style differences. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
  Ninety participants—most of whom were female (n = 70), Caucasian (n = 70) 
students enrolled at a large, midwestern university—were included in analyses after 
removal of two cases based on study completion time.  One of the removed cases was a 
statistical outlier on time (X = 5,322 seconds, Z = 8.24) and the other case’s completion 
time was too short to be considered logically valid (X = 18 seconds).  After case removal, 
participants completed the 55-item survey study in about 490 seconds on average (SD = 
287.13).    
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The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB) at the 
university where this study was conducted approved the design and procedures of the 
current investigation.  University students were recruited from the participant pool 
operated by the College of Education.  Students were offered extra credit in their courses 
in return for participation.  All surveys were administered online.  Upon clicking at link 
to the study website, participants were presented with a brief description of the study 
along with the primary investigator’s contact information.  Participants were also 
presented with descriptions of the voluntary nature, the limited risks, and the benefits of 
participation.  After clicking a link denoting their informed consent, participants were 
presented with demographic questions and psychometric questionnaires.  The indecision, 
ruminative response to negative mood, and creativity scales were the same as those used 
by Cohen and Ferrari (2010).  
Psychometric Scales  
Indecision.  The Decisional Procrastination Scale (DP; Mann, 1982), based on 
Janis and Mann’s (1977) social psychological theory of decision-making, is designed to 
measure patterns of coping with decisional conflict.  The reliability and validity of the DP 
has been estabilished in several studies of procrastination with internal reliabilities 
ranging from .72 to .80 and test-retest reliabilities over the course of 1 month ranging 
from .62 to .69 (Beswick et al., 1988; Mann, 1982; see Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 
1995 for review).  Previous investigators found positive correlations ranging from .29 to 
.42 for DP scores with measures of impatience, academic procrastination, locus of 
control, and absentmindedness.  They found negative correlations ranging from -.23 to -
.46 for DP scores with measures of non-competitiveness and low self-esteem (Beswick et 
  10 
al., 1988; Effert & Ferrari, 1989; For a review, see Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995). 
The DP consists of five indecision items (e.g., “I don’t make decisions unless I really have 
to”) that participants rank on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = not true for me; 5 = true for 
me).  Cronbach’s alpha for Cohen and Ferrari’s (2010) sample was .89.  In the current 
sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .72.   
Negative Rumination.  Overall, The RRS has acceptable consistency and 
convergent validity (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991) and is reliable over time (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999).  The RRS has been 
successfully used to predict likelihood and duration of depressive episode relapses (see 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 for an in-depth review of reliability and 
validity findings).  The Brooding (RRS-B) and Reflection (RRS-R) subscales of the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) each consist of 
five, 4-point Likert-type scale items (1 = almost never; 4 = almost always).  Treynor, 
Gonzelez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) factor-derived the Reflection and Brooding 
scales in a psychometric study of the RRS (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003).  They reported that internal reliability coefficients for RRS-R and RRS-B were 
expectedly low (Cronbach’s alphas were  .72 and .77, respectively) since each scale only 
has five items.  They noted that increasing the number of items per scale to 10 would 
yield an expected coefficient alpha of .85.  The test-retest reliability coefficients for two 
administrations twelve months apart were questionable (r = .60 and .62, respectively).  
Cohen and Ferrari (2010) found acceptable internal reliability coefficients for RRS-R and 
RRS-B in their sample (Cronbach’s alphas were .79 and .81, respectively).  I 
characterized RRS-B items as indicative of a self-immersed rumination style (e.g., “Think 
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about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better”) and RRS-R items as indicative of a 
self-distanced rumination style (e.g., “Go someplace alone to think about your feelings”). 
Cronbach’s alphas for the current sample were .81 and .75 for the RRS-B and RRS-R, 
respectively.  
Positive Rumination.  While a positive rumination scale, the Responses to 
Positive Affect Scale (RPA; Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, 2007), has been developed 
with itent to measure ruminative response to positive mood, it was not intended to mirror 
the two RRS subscales on a shared, cognitive construct.  Because I hypothesized that a 
similar cognitive construct, psychological self-distance, would exert opposite creativity 
influences for positive and negative rumination, I adapted RRS items to address positive 
mood responses on a positive rumination scale (PRS).  Since Cohen and Ferrari (2010) 
found that the self-distanced RRS items predicted creativity when participants responded 
to negative moods, I hypothesized the opposite for positive mood response:  that the PRS 
would capture two positive mood responses and that the self-immersed items would 
predict creativity.  The PRS Basking (PRS-B) and Interpreting (PRS-I) items were 
intended to parallel the RRS Brooding and Reflection scales, respectively.  Participants 
are instructed to indicate how they generally respond to positive mood.  A Basking 
example item is, “think, ‘I am proud of my actions.”	  	  An Interpreting example item is, 
“analyze your personality to try to understand why you are happy.”	  	  Like the RRS, PRS 
items are endorsed according to a 4-point Likert scale (1 = almost never; 4 = almost 
always).  Cronbach’s alphas in the current sample were .78 and .85 for PRS-B and PRS-I, 
respectively.   
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Creativity.  The Runco Ideational Behavior Scale (RIBS; Runco, Plucker, & 
Lim, 2001) is a unidimensional, 23-item, 4-point Likert-scale measure of ideas as 
products of original, divergent, and creative thinking (1 = never; 5 = very often).  Runco 
et al. (2001) reported excellent internal reliability (Cronbach’s alphas were .92 and .91) 
and noted that their instrument was independent of grade point average (r = .106) and 
creative attitudes (r = .32 and .34).  Items address divergent thinking as the number of 
ideas (e.g., “I come up with a lot of ideas and solutions”) and originality as rarity of ideas 
(e.g., “I have many wild ideas”).  Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in Cohen and Ferrari’s (2010) 
sample and in the current sample. 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
  The first hypothesis—that greater Reflection (RRS-R scores) would predict 
greater creativity (RIBS scores), especially in the presence of greater indecision (DP 
scores)—was based on Cohen and Ferrari’s (2010) moderation analysis.  Their procedure 
adhered to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) stipulation that the moderating variable must relate 
to the predictor variable but not the criterion.  Preliminary results for the present sample 
did not meet Baron and Kenny’s standards.  The moderation variable, DP, was not 
significantly related to the focal variable, RRS-R, for the current sample (r = -.02, p > 
.876; see Table A2).  Although women (M = 12.01, SD = 3.71) tended to score higher on 
RRS-R than men (M = 10.65, SD = 2.43), average RRS-R scores by gender were not 
significantly different after correcting for a violation of the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance for the general linear model, t(46.95) = -1.94, p = .058.  There was also no 
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significant difference between average Brooding (RRS-B) scores for men (M = 11.25, SD 
= 2.95) and women (M = 11.89, SD = 3.69), t(88) = -.71, p = .481.  The limited number 
of male participants in the current sample may account for failure to replicate 
significantly greater RRS-R and RRS-B scores for women than for men as found in a 
previous investigation (Treynor et al., 2003).  RRS-R and RRS-I scores were positively 
related (r = .33, p = .002), and suggest the possibility of a general tendency to respond to 
moods from a self-distanced perspective, regardless of mood valence.  However, a 
general tendency to respond from a self-immersed perspective across mood states does 
not hold since RRS-B and PRS-B were not significantly related (r = -.20, p = .074).  
Problematically, within-mood response styles were significantly and positively related for 
positive mood (r = .60, p = .002) and negative mood (r = .62, p < .001), suggesting that 
response styles were not structurally independent for the current sample. 
Negative Rumination 
After mean-centering all variables, I explored seven effects in a regression 
equation for negative rumination styles: three conditional effects (RRS-R, RRS-B, and 
DP), all possible two-way interactions, and one three-way interaction (see Table A3).  
Examination of residuals did not suggest violations of the general linear model.  In a 
significant model, R2 = .28, F(7, 82) = 4.50, p < .001, higher Indecision scores predicted 
lower RIBS scores (β = -.05, t = -2.23, p < .028). 
Positive Rumination 
  After mean-centering all variables, I tested seven effects for variables in a 
regression equation for positive rumination styles: three conditional effects (PRS-B, PRS-
I, and DP), all possible two-way interactions, and one three-way interaction (see Table 
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A4).  In a significant model, R2 = .24, F(7, 82) = 3.66, p = .002, the interaction of PRS-B 
×	  DP was significant (β = .38, t = 3.22, p = .002).  In a reduced, significant model with 
PRS-B, DP, and their interaction, F(3,86) = 2.82, p = .044, R2 = .09, the interaction effect 
remained significant (β	  = .24, t = 2.28, p = .025).  A simple slopes test (Aiken & West, 
1991) for post-hoc analysis of the significant interaction effect indicated that PRS-B 
scores predicted greater RIBS scores when DP scores were high, t(89) = 2.64, p = .010, 
and that PRS-B scores did not predict RIBS scores when DP scores were low, t(89) = -
.70, p =.487 (see Figure A1).  I used the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & 
Neyman, 1936; Bauer & Curran, 2005) to find that the conditional effect for PRS-B on 
RIBS was statistically significant (α= .05) when the average DP score was equal to or 
greater than 13.59 (uncentered).   
Discussion 
Cohen and Ferrari’s (2010) findings were not replicated in the present 
investigation as reflective style of ruminative response to negative mood did not predict 
greater creativity.  Furthermore, higher indecision scores predicted lower creativity 
scores, and there were no moderating effects for indecision.  There is no readily apparent 
account for these mixed findings since the studies do not seem to meaningfully differ 
with regard to psychometric measures or their online means of administration to 
participant samples with relatively similar demographic characteristics.  The present 
sample was composed of more female participants who were younger than Cohen and 
Ferrari’s sample of 85 participants  (57 female participants, M age = 32.95, SD = 12.23).  
Although previous investigators found that women scored higher on Reflection and 
Brooding scales (Treynor et al., 2003), the limited number of male participants in the 
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current sample may have contributed a failure to replicate significant gender differences 
for Reflection or Brooding.  However, female (M = 12.01, SD = 3.71) students scored 
higher than male students (M =10.65, SD = 2.43) on the Reflection scale, t(46.95) = 1.94, 
p = .058.  Female students’ (M = 11.89, SD = 3.69) and male students’ (M = 11.25, SD = 
2.95) Brooding scores were roughly equal, t(88) = 0.71, p = .481. 
Although age-related differences in self-referential thought have been 
demonstrated in previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
(Mitchell, Raye, Ebner, Tubridy, Frankel, & Johnson, 2009), the participants in the 
current study are not substantially younger than Cohen and Ferrari’s participant sample. 
Nonetheless, age-related differences in self-referential thought cannot be definitively 
ruled out.  Furthermore, age-related differences in divergent thinking have been found for 
aspects of divergent thinking—an important RIBS component.  Reese, Lee, Cohen, and 
Pucket (2001) found that middle-aged adults, 40- to 50-years-old, scored higher that on 
measures of fluency, flexibility, and originality.   
Mixed findings may be attributable to differences in higher education experience 
or to differences in religiosity.  Most participants in the current sample were attending a 
university where many students espouse Christian Evangelical religious beliefs.  Cohen 
and Ferrari’s sample of participants were college graduates who were recruited by 
students enrolled in courses at a Catholic university.  Frederick and Embry-Riddle (2001) 
Mormons scored higher on measures of religiosity and lower on measures of religious 
creative thought than non-Mormon Christians.  Their findings demonstrate the possibility 
that religious affiliation may affect creativity. 
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Results partially supported the second hypothesis that a self-immersed ruminative 
response to positive mood would predict creativity in the presence of low levels of 
indecision.  In the current sample, high levels of indecision moderated the relationship 
between positive rumination and creativity such that self-immersed positive rumination 
predicted creativity when indecision was high.  Due to the exploratory nature of this 
study and lack of theoretical explanations for the effects of procrastination on creativity, 
future studies are indicated to examine how indecision may benefit a self-immersed 
response to positive mood if the results of this study are replicated in the future.  For 
positive mood responses, it may be the case that indecision is adaptive insofar as it allows 
more time for the incorporation of new ideas into a person’s reservoir of problem-solving 
strategies —as Weisberg (1983) and Cohen and Ferrari (2010) suggested.  It could also 
be the case that indecision facilitates creativity when people bask in positive moods by 
reducing risk for impulsive and anti-social behaviors or manic episode relapses 
(Rybakowski & Klonowska, 2011).  
Guastello and his colleagues (Guastello, Guastello, & Hanson, 2004) argued that 
emotional intelligence provides a “counterweight against mood disorders in enhancing 
creative production”	  based on their analysis of creativity measures for participants with a 
history of receiving treatment for a mood disorder (p. 260).  They found a link between a 
history of mood disorder and creativity, and they found greater emotional intelligence 
and ideational fluency for participants who had completed treatment as compared to 
participants who were still in treatment.   Other investigators have concluded that 
emotional dampening of positive moods may be a learned defensive response for 
reducing recurrence of manic episodes for participants with a history of bipolar disorder 
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(Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith, & Harvey, 2011).  Perhaps decisional procrastination 
limits negative effects of positive moods by allowing more time for emotional regulation 
strategies such as emotional dampening to occur. 
Limitations 
Several threats to the validity of this study should be considered.  While the RIBS, 
RRS, and DP scales have demonstrated adequate reliability and validity, the 
psychometric integrity of the PRS has not been fully demonstrated.  This limitation is 
mitigated by its basis on the RRS and demonstration of a facilitative effect for a self-
immersed positive rumination style in directions that support the dual pathway to 
creativity model and construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  Given the 
questionable accuracy of self-report (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), the relatively homogenous 
demographic characteristics of the present sample, and the restrictions of confidence in 
conclusions about causal relations in research designs without experimental 
manipulations, future studies with behavioral measures, more diverse participant samples, 
and experimental manipulations are indicated to increase confidence in conclusions about 
the results of this study.  It should be noted that participants have been unlikely to 
overestimate their creative abilities on popular self-report scales as evidenced by the fact 
that scores on creativity self-report surveys tend to gather on the low end of distributions 
(Silvia, Wigert, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2011).  Future psychometric analyses of 
PRS items are suggested.   
Conclusions 
Despite limitations to design and instrumentation, this preliminary exploration of 
rumination styles support conclusions that a self-immersed response to positive mood 
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predicted creativity when indecision was also high.  Moreover, the PRS captured positive 
rumination style differences in the current sample in the same way that the RRS captured 
negative rumination style differences in previous samples.  These conclusions are 
relevant for Treynor’s, Gonzalez’s, and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (2003) call for further RST 
refinement in two important ways.  First, the present investigation offers descriptions of 
rumination styles in the context of self-distance and thereby clarifies previous conflations 
of mood and cognition.  Second, the present investigation offers a test of a self-distance 
account for rumination style differences that extend beyond previous researchers’ and 
clinicians’ preoccupations with negative mood responses.  These findings lend support to 
the idea that self-distance is operant across mood valences.   
The present investigation has practical implications for mental health clinicians, 
as well.  While theorists initially used rumination research to predict and explain risk for 
depressive episode relapses for people with a history of depression, therapists used 
rumination research to inform prevention strategies.  Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy for Depression (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2013) is an empirically 
validated treatment (American Psychological Association Task Force on Evidence-Based 
Practice, 2006) explicitly based on deterring passive rumination on the self and 
depressive symptomology.  Segal and his colleagues wrote that Nolen-Hoeksema’s 
rumination research reveals that people with higher risk for depressive episode relapses 
“respond to low mood by acting in ways that focus attention on themselves, while others 
do things that take their minds away from themselves” (p. 32).  In part, they use Nolen-
Hoeksema’s work to inform mindfulness practices as a distraction technique.  Findings 
from the present study contribute to MBCT by illustrating benefits of thinking about the 
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self from a self-distanced perspective rather than a distraction from the self.  From a self-
distanced point-of-view, the self may be attended to in the context of meaning, beliefs, 
and values.  Furthermore, MBCT practitioners may benefit from encouraging self-
immersion as an adaptive response to positive moods that may decrease likelihood of 
depressive episode relapse even further.  A two-pronged approach in this way may have 
an additive effect for reducing risk for depression through avoidance or dampening of 
negative emotional arousal heightening of positive emotional arousal (Martin & Tesser, 
1996; Ayduk & Kross, 2008). 
Present findings may inform expressive writing interventions intended to improve 
mental and physical wellness.   In an expressive writing task where participants were 
asked to write about past trauma, Pennebaker and Graybeal (2001) found a weak link 
between use of emotion words and improved health, but they found that use of cognitive 
words was a strong predictor.  Cognitive words were causal (e.g., “because”) or insightful 
(e.g., “realize”; p. 91-92) and may suggest a self-distanced rumination style indicative of 
abstraction and interpretation.  Perhaps opposite effects would be found for participants 
who are asked to write about positive memories—with greater benefits for writers who 
use more emotion words from a self-immersed, first-person perspective.  F. Scott 
Fitzgerald may have been glad to know that self-immersion into his own happy ending 
could revive his old creative talent better than his self-distancing suspicions and 
interpretations.  
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Appendix: Tables and Figure 
Table A1 
 
Sample Demographic Characteristics (N = 90) 
 
Characteristic	   n	   %	  
Gender	     
Female	   70	   78	  
Male	   20	   22	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   0	   0	  
Race	     
White	   70	   71	  
Black	   8	   9	  
Asian or Pacific Islander	   5	   6	  
American Indian	   4	   4	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   3	   3	  
Multi-Racial	   0	   0	  
Age	     
18-28	   81	   90	  
29-39	   6	   7	  
40-50	   3	   3	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   0	   0	  
Classification	     
Junior	   30	   33	  
Sophomore	   20	   22	  
Senior	   14	   16	  
Freshman	   13	   14	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   13	   14	  
Highest Degree Completed	     
High School	   58	   64	  
Associate	   15	   17	  
Bachelor	   12	   13	  
Masters	   2	   2	  
  30 
Characteristic n % 
Other	   2	   2	  
Doctoral	   1	   1	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   0	   0	  
College	     
Education	   47	   52	  
Arts & Sciences	   16	   18	  
The Graduate College	   9	   10	  
Human Sciences	   7	   8	  
Business	   6	   7	  
Agriculture	   3	   3	  
Other or Prefer not to respond	   0	   0	  
Note.  Totals of percentages are not 100 for every characteristic because of rounding.	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Table A2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for the Creativity Criterion Variable, 
Indecision Moderator Variable, and Rumination Predictor Variables (N = 90) 
 
Variable	   M	   SD	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
Creativity Measure	   79.36	   15.13	   .38***	   .46***	   .17	   .24*	  
Indecision Measure	   12.73	   3.82	   .28**	   -.02	   -.24*	   -.07	  
Rumination Predictors	         
1. Brooding	   11.74	   3.54	   —	   .62***	   -.19	   .01	  
2.  Reflecting	   11.71	   3.50	    —	   .07	   .33**	  
3. Basking	   13.50	   3.33	     —	   .60**	  
4. Interpreting	   11.07	   3.84	      —	  
Note.  Reflecting and Brooding subscales are from the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS).  Basking and 
Interpreting subscales are from the Positive Rumination Scale (PRS). 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001.	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Table A3 
Regression Analysis Summary for Ruminative Response to Negative Mood Variables 
Predicting Creativity (N = 90) 
 
Predictor variable	   B	   SE B	   β	   t	   p	  
Reflecting	   .046	   .025	   .247	   1.88	   .064	  
Brooding	   .049	   .025	   .263	   1.94	   .056	  
Indecision	   -.047	   .021	   -.271	   -2.23	   .028	  
Reflecting ×	  Brooding	   -.001	   .005	   -.020	   -0.20	   .846	  
Reflecting ×	  Indecision	   .000	   .007	   .007	   0.05	   .963	  
Brooding ×	  Indecision	   -.005	   .007	   -.095	   -0.69	   .495	  
Reflecting ×	  Brooding ×	  
Indecision	   .001	   .001	   .146	   1.26	   .211	  
Note. Reflecting is self-distanced, and Brooding is self-immersed. Indecision is the moderator 
variable. 
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Table A4 
Regression Analysis Summaries for Positive Rumination Style and Indecision Variables 
Predicting Creativity 
 
Model 1 Variables	   B	   SE B	   β	   t	   p	  
Interpeting	   .023	   .023	   .137	   1.02	   .310	  
Basking	   .010	   .025	   .153	   0.42	   .678	  
Indecision	   -.030	   .021	   -.176	   -1.46	   .147	  
Interpeting ×	  Basking	   .012	   .005	   .255	   2.38	   .019	  
Interpreting ×	  Indecision	   -.011	   .006	   -.248	   -1.93	   .057	  
Basking ×	  Indecision	   .022	   .007	   .378	   3.22	   .002	  
Basking ×	  Interpreting ×	  Indecision .001 .001 .118 1.03 .307 
Model 2 Variables  B SE B β t p 
Basking .032 .021 .161 1.51 .134 
Indecision -.010 .018 -.057 -0.53 .595 
Basking ×	  Indecision .014 .006 .236 2.28 .025 
Note. Basking is self-immersed, and Interpreting is self-distanced.  Indecision is the moderator variable. 	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Figure A1. Predicted Runco Ideational Behavior Scores (RIBS) for High and Low (+/- 1 
SD) Indecision and Basking.  Values are for mean-centered variables.   
*p < .05.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 
In a letter to his wife, Francis Scott Fitzgerald (1940/2002) remarked on his 
curious loss of creative talent when times were good:  “It’s odd that my old talent for the 
short story vanished.  …Part of it was somehow tied up somehow with you and me—the 
happy ending”	  (p. 373).  Recent epidemiological studies support Fitzgerald’s sense that 
his discontent and creative talent were somehow linked.  People who are employed for 
their creative production have much higher rates of depression, mania, suicide, substance 
abuse, untimely death, psychoticism, and schizophrenia than the general public (Jamison, 
1993; Richards, 1997; Simonton, 1994; Eysenck, 1993; Guastello, Guastello, & Hanson, 
1994; Kaufman, 2003; Ludwig, 1994).  Old and new suspicions abound concerning these 
relationships.  Nietzsche (1889/1977), for instance, argued that frenzy was necessary for 
productivity and motivation.  Eysenck (1993) attended to the over-inclusive thinking 
prevalent in both psychotic and creative thinking.  Kaufman and Baer (2002) wondered if 
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heightened focus on emotions, common in depression and literary works, explains the 
connection between creativity and depression.  Mraz and Runco (1994) specified a knack 
for finding problems that seems to be common to depression and creative problem 
solving.  These theories and speculations are further complicated by experimental studies 
that support contradictory conclusions that creative thinking is facilitated by happiness. 
Based on her review of mood and cognitive processing, Isen (2001) claimed that 
“in most circumstances, positive affect enhances problem solving and decision making, 
leading to cognitive processing that is not only flexible, innovative, and creative, but also 
thorough and efficient”	  (p. 75).  Indeed, several studies do seem to support conclusions 
that people engage in cognitive process elements underlying creative ideation when they 
are in a positive mood.  Happy people are more likely to perform better on tasks where 
they are required to think with broader categories.  For instance, Isen, Daubman, and 
Nowicki (1987) induced positive and negative moods in participants and found that the 
positive mood group outperformed negative and control groups on the Remote Associates 
Test (RAT; Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964) and Duncker’s (1945) Candle 
Problem.  Correct answers on the RAT are thought to require participants to make loose 
associations across categories.  To illustrate, participants are asked to produce a word 
linking three other words such as cottage, Swiss, and cake (answer:  cheese).  Likewise, 
Duncker’s Candle Problem is thought to require broad categorization because participants 
must creatively find a solution by formulating novel use for a familiar object.  Similar 
experimental studies demonstrate superior performance for happier participants on tests 
of originality and cognitive flexibility (Hirt et al., 1996; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 
1990; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985).   
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Mixed findings have led some to plea for a truce of sorts where controversies are 
dispelled in a spirit of benign acceptance of differences.  Wise, if not parochial, parables 
of cooperation are begot from dynamical systems theories of creativity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).  In an admonition familiar enough to have become cliché, 
theorists (Wehner, Csikszentmihalyi & Magyari-Beck, 1991) warn that “we touch 
different parts of the same beast and derive distorted pictures of the whole from what we 
know:  ‘The elephant is like a snake’	  says the one who holds its tail; ‘The elephant is like 
a wall’	  says the one who touches its flanks”	  (p. 270).  Other theories of motivation and 
cognitive bias provide more compelling integration of mixed findings.  The dual-pathway 
model to creativity (De Dreu, Baas, Nijstad, 2008), for instance, explains how both 
positive and negative moods may lead to creativity through different routes.   
According to the cognitive tuning model (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994), 
naturally selected biases are activated by ongoing appraisals of safety and danger in the 
environment.  As mood states inform assessment input, negative moods signal danger 
requiring persistence and effortful problem solving.  On the other hand, positive moods 
signal safety and thereby motivate less effortful persistence and more risk-taking 
exploration.  In De Dreu et al.’s (2008) dual-pathway model, negative moods facilitate 
creativity through a persistence pathway by motivating effortful attention on a particular 
problem.  Positive moods facilitate creativity through a cognitive flexibility pathway 
marked by willingness to take risks and explore.  Furthermore, De Dreu et al. specify that 
mood states for both positive and negative pathways must be activating.  Activating 
moods, characterized by increased arousal and approach motivation, include anger, as 
opposed to sadness, or joy, as opposed to satisfaction.  Mikulincer and his colleagues 
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(Mikulincer, Paz, & Kedem, 1990) found that fear and anxiety led participants to think 
with more narrow cognitive categories while Derryberry and Reed (1998) found that 
anxious or fearful participants were less likely to shift attention.  Verhaeghen, Joormann, 
and Khan (2005) found that rumination in response to negative mood and performance on 
indicators of creativity were linked by persistence and seriousness about creative 
endeavors.    
In the following review, I will first provide examples of popular approaches to 
creativity throughout the history of creativity research.    Second, I will highlight 
important findings that support the “dark side”	  (Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 
2010) and “bright side”	  of the mood-creativity debate in the psychological literature, and I 
will trace these arguments to their promising synthesis in the dual-pathway model to 
creativity (De Dreu, et al., 2008).  Third, I will then align dual-model perspectives with 
findings in the rumination literature where creativity has been linked to different 
rumination styles (Treynor, Gonzalez, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Cohen and Ferrari, 2010).  
Fourth, I will make the case that rumination theorists unintentionally over-emphasize the 
impact of mood valence by highlighting how psychological distance accounts for the way 
in which self-perspective, as a mood response, activates biases that are variously adaptive 
for creative ideation (Trope & Liberman, 2010). I will also make the case that rumination 
theories under-emphasize the impact of rumination as a response to positive mood 
(Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, 2007), Finally, I will offer future directions concerning 
the impact that different rumination styles may have for creative ideation based on 
existing theories of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
Lyubomirksy, 2003) and psychological distance. 
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Histories of Creativity Research 
 Histories of creativity research are humble and tentative.  By way of introduction, 
most authors, whose styles are most likely informed by a probabilistic, post-positivist 
tact, begin their handbook chapters with condolences to any authoritative, single history 
or theory.  Albert and Runco (1999), for instance, titled their Handbook of Creativity 
chapter, “A [emphasis added] History of Research on Creativity”	  as a “signal to readers 
that  [they] recognize that he history [they] describe is one among other possible histories 
of the same subject”	  (p. 16).    However, some historians cannot help but privilege their 
own disciplines over others.  For instance, Sternberg and Lubart (1999) minimize 
approaches in other traditions as consequences of so-called pre-scientific thinking.  
Sternberg and Lubart (1999) argued that “mystical beliefs”	  associated with creativity 
studies have “tainted”	  scientific investigations (p. 4).  But by classifying and minimizing 
two thousand years of thinking on creativity in this way, they ignore the contribution of 
historical movements that continue to direct current research initiatives in psychology.  
Surely, Kant’s (1790/1951) Critique of Judgment, for instance, is not useless for 
psychological research.  His work on “faculties of mind that constitute genius,”	  is akin to 
contemporary approaches in cognitive psychology (p. 277).  Shelley’s (1840/1998) 
conception of artistic inspiration in his Defense of Poetry relates to psychological theories 
of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) and insight (Duncker, 1945). 
Eminence   
Albert and Runco (1999) are more interdisciplinary than other psychological 
historians.  They provided an account of creativity approaches by attributing origins of 
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contemporary research trends to individuals who are considered eminent in the history of 
social scientific scholarship.  Most notably, they trace notions of art as deviant rebellion 
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Romantic defiance of middle-class, industrial society and 
Adam Smith’s effort to predict social consequences of industrial upheaval of large 
populations.  Furthermore, they argue that—while Charles Darwin (1859/2003) 
highlighted creativity as a problem-solving adaptation—Francis Galton (1869/2005) 
operationalized diversity as individual difference, a concept that has remained a staple in 
behavioral statistics, especially in psychometric approaches to creativity.  Psychologists 
still measure individual differences in the characteristics and abilities of creative people.  
But Albert and Runco argue that methods are not the only disciplinarian inheritances 
from eminent scholars.  Zeitgeist is captured by researcher intentions as well.   
 Albert and Runco maintain that Terman’s (1924) study of genius, for instance, 
was a return to Smith’s benevolent attempts to predict and explain social consequences. 
With Guilford’s (1950) explication of factor analysis came the idea that people differed 
with regard to the amount of creativity they have, and that this amount can be quantified 
by defining and organizing attribute complexes (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001).  The 
creativity complex would be measured by divergent thinking tests (Guilford, 1950; 
Wallach & Kogan, 1965) that encompass the following (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999): 
fluency (total number of ideas), flexibility (total number of different perspectives), 
originality (response infrequency in a normal distribution), and elaboration (degree of 
responses that extend beyond test prompts). 
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 Albert and Runco’s taxonomy illustrates the ways in which form and content are 
interdependent.  Classification by authorship implicitly attributes ideas to individuals, an 
approach that has been criticized elsewhere in social science (e.g., Foucault, 1969).  In 
creativity research, these kinds of attribution biases facilitate reification of constructs as 
situated within persons.  From this perspective, correlates of creativity, such as mood 
disorders and psychoticism, are informed or caused by cognitive processes and 
experiences located within an individual.  Many psychological investigations of the 
relationship between mood and creativity take for granted that pathology is the result of 
creators’	  personalities or cognitive processes and that eminence is the result of genius.  
These conceptualizations can be useful, but they are limited by the fact that they do not 
attend to endogenous factors like cultural and economic valuations of art that also play an 
important role in the mood states and other experiences of artists.  Social psychological 
theories on misattribution error (Cohen, Maoz, & Trope, 1988; Forgas, 1998; Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995; Harvey, Town, Yarkin, & Kazdin, 2000) have shown how people—even 
psychological researchers—can over-attribute causes to persons over situations. It could 
be the case, for instance, that artists’	  monetary income accounts for more of the variance 
in their moods or pathology risk than variables of mainstream concern in psychology. 
Content  
Rhodes’	  (1961) description of the four P’s of creativity is one of the most well-
known taxonomies in creativity studies.  The P’s are denoted by their concern with the 
content of research investigations.  They are:  person, process, product, and press 
(environment).  Person studies can be single-case, phenomenological investigations or 
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longitudinal studies of eminent persons, but most address personality traits that derive 
from nomothetic measures.  Feist (1998) provides a history of common personality 
attributes found by several personality psychologists who maintain that such 
characteristics are adequately captured with self-report surveys.  Some of these 
personality descriptors—most of which are negative—are: rebellious, impulsive, 
emotionally labile, manic, sensitive, anxious, aloof, unfriendly, and ambitious.  
 The creative process is often associated with researchers who parcel out and 
measure elements of development, thinking, or action that people engage in when they 
create.  In Finke, Ward, and Smith’s (1992) geneplore model, for instance, individuals 
enter a generative phase (characterized by invention of mental representations) and an 
exploratory phase (characterized by exploration of these mental representations).  Each 
phase has distinct processes (e.g., retrieval, association, synthesis).  Yokochi and Okada 
(2005) observed an artist while painting and then interviewed him afterward.  Like Finke 
et. al. (1992), they found preparatory and exploratory stages by finding that their subject 
tended to begin with a relatively repetitive pattern of specific images (e.g., trees, rocks) as 
he gradually formed a global image.  Nelson and Rawlings (2007) used a 
phenomenological approach in their interviews with eleven artists.  They found pre-
preparatory engagement as a constituent of the creative process as well as a subjectively 
felt tension between the distance and engagement.  Psychological distance is an 
especially salient topic in studies on emotional regulation (Verduyn, Mechelen, Kross, 
Chezzi, & Van Bever (2012) and has recently grown in relevance for creativity theorists. 
Critical Theory 
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Critical theorists are have made signification contributions to creativity 
approaches in psychology as critical theory represents a nexus between philosophical and 
scientific ways of thinking about society and culture.  Its importance in the history of art 
and literary studies lend appeal for creativity researchers concerned with aesthetics.  
Beginning philosophical ventures in critical theory are generally rife with descriptions of 
universal elements of quality in creative processes, authors, and texts.  Contemporary 
shifts in critical theory, however, have a more action-oriented concern with societal 
conflicts for power and dominance.  An emerging confluence between evolutionary 
theory in the “hard sciences”	  and cultural studies in the humanities also informs critical 
theory in philosophy and literature.  This sort of art-science consilience is rooted in the 
origins of American psychology but was temporarily superseded by radical behaviorism.  
Richter (1998) provides a history of popular critical theory maps as described below. 
 Content-based typology.  Abrams (1953/1971) differentiated literary theories 
into four types according to their content emphasis changes throughout time.  He termed 
these: mimetic, rhetorical, expressive, and formal.  Mimetic theorists of classical 
antiquity concerned themselves with the relationship between art works and the world, 
believing that art imitates reality.  Rhetorical theorists in the classical period, Middle 
Ages, and Renaissance emphasized art work and audience relationships, believing that 
literature should delight and inform.  Expressive theorists were concerned with the 
relationship between artists and products (person and product; Rhodes, 1961), believing 
that unique abilities serve creative acts. Formal theorists today emphasize aesthetic 
element relationships within a text.  Theoretical paradigms emerged in American 
psychology during the burgeoning of formal theories.  Nonetheless, perhaps in 
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unacknowledged ways, Abrams’	  other typologies inform different intradisciplinary 
tendencies.  Transactional theorists in psychology departments, for instance, might find 
traction with mimetic and rhetorical emphases on relationships between agents and 
environments while qualitative researchers may prefer rhetorical approaches for their 
emphasis on personal meaning.  Psychometric researchers may prefer expressive theories 
for their focus on ability correlates.  Evolutionary, behavioral, comparative, and 
physiological psychologists might prefer positivist orientation in formal theories of 
literature. 
 Level of abstraction typology.  In his descriptions of Crane and Friedman, 
Richter (1998) presents an integrated map of kinds of interpretation.  In order of their 
level of abstraction—from universal or broad to individual or specific—interpretive lines 
of inquiry are the following:  ethical/myth and archetype, historical, sociological, 
biographical/psychological, and formal.  Each interpretive type is inclusive of the more 
specific types.  Higher-order abstractions, such as ethical interpretations, include more 
universal elements of textual form, or cultural interpretations of these textual forms.  This 
taxonomy helps clarify paradigmatic perspectives of researchers by virtue of their explicit 
positionality within arts and sciences discourses.  Post-positivist social scientists have 
been chastised by social action scientists, for instance, for their disregard for social-
historical influences and ethical failures.  By situating them in the formal rung of 
interpretive types, they are understood by their implicit emphasis on empirical 
measurements of observable elements. Critics of traditional science may believe that 
empirical approaches in formal-interpretive approaches are inappropriate for conclusions 
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more akin to biographical/psychological and sociological interpretations of a higher 
order.   
 Methods typology.  Richter (1998) outlines McKeon’s sematic map as an 
organization of methods.  These methods are:  dialectical (operational, problematic, 
logistic), expressive, and formal.  The goal of dialectical methods is to approximate 
congruence between mental models and the truth these models represent.  Operational 
thinkers like Plato believe that congruence can be approximated with a universal model 
while problematic thinkers like Aristotle believe that many, domain-specific models are 
necessary.  This thinking style difference echoes some of the controversy among 
psychologists concerning the degree to which creativity, like most other psychological 
constructs, should be approached as a domain-general or domain-specific phenomenon 
(Sternberg, 2005).  Logistic thinkers are as suspicious of operational holism as 
problematic thinkers, but their modern scientific methodology reduces systems to 
constituent elements by virtue of a single method for all phenomena.  Creativity 
researches often include logistic models of interplay between constituents like personality 
traits (Person, e.g., Openness to Experience), cognitive processes (process, e.g., fluency).  
McKeon’s typology reveals methodological assumptions about the nature of creativity 
that are rooted in historical modes of thought, some of which predate so-called “scientific 
thinking”	  (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). 
The Dark Side of Creativity 
Creative People are Deluded  
 Given the divergent and multi-disciplined approaches to creativity, it should be no 
surprise that the creativity literature has many controversies.  Perhaps the most 
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controversial area of debate among creativity researchers has been whether or not 
creativity represents a risk for psychological problems (“the dark side”) or is an 
expression of optimal cognitive and mood functioning (“the bright side”).  The dark side 
of creativity was borne from anecdotes and prevalence rate studies.  Ancient and modern 
philosophical texts are thick with descriptions of the unfortunate dispositions manifested 
in great thinkers (see Simonton’s [1994] tracing of the “Mad Genius”	  stereotype to 
Aristotle).  These attitudes continue to inform popular attitudes to such an extent that 
some wonder if the only link between creativity and suffering is the implicit, self-
fulfilling belief that creative people must be emotionally distraught in order to achieve.    
Plucker and his colleagues (Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004) have termed this 
romanticized belief the “lone nut”	  perspective.  
The Mad Genius Endorsement Scale (MGES; Kaufman, Bromley, & Cole, 2006) 
is an internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .83; Cole & Kaufman, 2006), 
unidimensional measure consisting of seven items that are rated on a 9-point Likert scale.  
Interestingly, both high and low scorers on the MGES obtained the higher scores on the 
Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick 1962; Mednick & Mednick, 1967) than 
participants who obtained mid-range MGES scores, leading the authors to conclude that 
the mad genius stereotype is a dividing issue among people who take creativity seriously.  
More linear results were found for scores between the MGES and a measure of self-
reported creativity, called the Creative Personality Scale (CPS; Goldberg, 1999).  High 
MGES scorers also obtained significantly higher scores on the CPS than medium and low 
MGES scorers, indicating the people who believe they are creative tend to believe in the 
Mad Genius stereotype.  From this the authors were led to wonder if participants desired 
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to believe that they were capable of mad genius similar to expressions found in eminently 
creative people in popular culture.   
 Self-report measures have resurged in psychology—and in creativity research 
more especially—owing in part to critiques of the radical behaviorist and the positivist 
traditions that prevailed in psychology at the turn of the twentieth century (Fuchs & 
Milar, 2003). But more importantly, researchers in domains that span the wide spectrum 
of human performance have successfully demonstrated the consequences that implicit 
beliefs have for behavior thanks to cognitive psychologists who took special charge of 
self-report momentum by showing how beliefs, attitudes, and values variously inform 
motivation and task engagement.  Critical theorists also contributed to the like-minded, 
interpretive zeitgeist in the social sciences, albeit from a more explicit, political angle, by 
dispelling myths associated with objectivity and by examining creators’	  self-beliefs in the 
context of a constructed dialogue.  In the context of the dark side of creativity, many 
critical theorists take the mad genius myth for granted even as they lament its unfair 
characterization. 
Creative People are Victims 
 Susan Sontag was an especially vocal critic against the unfortunate status of the 
artist in society.   In her seminal essay, Against Interpretation, Sontag (1969/1998) 
located the origin of the Mad Genius myth in Plato’s mimetic theory.  From the moment 
art became mimesis, or imitation, Sontag argued that art had to justify itself since it was 
no longer good enough on its own merits.  She believed that theory in art has so infected 
aesthetic, sensual experience, that no one can directly experience a work of art without 
feeling overcome by an insatiable need to interpret its so-called true, hidden meaning.  
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Sontag pined for a lost paradise where no one felt a need to ask what aesthetic experience 
meant.  Michel Foucault (trans. 1969/1997) also begrudged mainstream notions about 
artists, but he located its origins in struggles against specific technologies of power and 
control.  He argued that authors became ill at ease when they acquired ownership over 
their books as market goods in the nineteenth century, and he suspected that they 
“compensated for the status”	  of ownership by becoming more and more transgressive in 
order to restore danger to art (p. 894).  The same critique could doubtless be made in 
mainstream psychology research approaches to creativity where psychometric 
instruments are validated by products affording prestige and consensual high regard for 
the creator. 
Creative People Have Bad Personalities 
 Foucault, like many social constructivist theorists, would probably find creative 
personality research abhorrent because it approaches creativity as a reified construct 
embedded in the static character of the person.  But even if the word personality is only 
an illusory term that merely covers a class of related and temporally stable behaviors, 
personality instruments are at least defensible for their reliability.  Indeed, certain 
personality traits repeatedly emerge as consistent correlates of creative achievement.  
Feist (1998) provides a remarkably exhaustive index of over one hundred artistic 
personality comparison studies that demonstrate lower conscientiousness and warmth and 
greater anxiety, affective illness, emotional sensitivity, hostility, aloofness, and 
unfriendliness in creative artists (pp. 276-277).   
An all-star cast of prominent creativity researchers (Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-
Palmon, & Wigert, 2009) conducted a survey study of 1304 undergraduate students in 
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which they found significant structural equation modeling (SEM) paths between self-
reported creativity—as measured by no less than four scales—and personality traits 
measured by the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009), an instrument that separates the 
Big Five personality trait, Agreeableness, into the following two traits:  Honesty-
Humility and Agreeableness.  The authors found that the Honesty-Humility trait, 
characterized by “facets of sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, and modesty”	  and the 
Agreeableness trait, characterized by	  “facets of forgiveness, gentleness, flexibility, and 
patience,”	  negatively predicted creativity (p. 688).  Their model explained a respectable 
35.3% of the variance in creativity scores. 
Creative People are Distracted 
Highly creative people express a lack of conscientiousness in quasi-experimental 
studies of inattention and impulsivity.  Higher creativity scores and greater delay 
aversions, for instance, are found in hyperactive children (Shaw, 1992; Kuntsi, 
Oosterlaan, & Stevenson, 2001).  Kasof (1997) presented sixty participants with a trait 
breadth of attention measure and a poem-writing task.  Subsequently, forty participants 
were randomly assigned to a condition where they had to write a second poem in the 
presence of distractible noises while the remaining twenty-one participants were asked to 
write a second poem in a quiet room.  Thirteen volunteer undergraduate students rated 
each poem on a 101-point scale based on their own subjective conception of creativity.  
Poem originality was measured by coding word frequencies found in Palermo and 
Jenkins (1964) word association norms for undergraduates.  Kasof found a positive 
relationship between creative performance and trait breadth of attention.  Participants 
who authored more creative poems were also more easily to be distracted by noise.    
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Takeuchi et al. (2011) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
discover a positive relationship between creativity—as measured by a divergent thinking 
task—and greater activation in the precuneus when participants performed a working 
memory (WM) task.  Greater precuneus activation was also associated with poorer WM 
performance.  The authors reasoned that inhibition of the precuneus is an expression of a 
reallocation of cognitive resources away from networks that are irrelevant for particular 
tasks.  Therefore, they concluded that greater divergent thinking performance stems from 
inefficient and diffuse allocation of attention.  The precuneus is part of the default mode 
network (DMN), an area located in the medial prefrontal cortices (mPFC) and posterior 
cingulate cortices that becomes deactivated during working memory tasks.  Reduced 
task-induced deactivation (TID) of the DMN may cause diffuse or inefficient attention 
because emotional arousal interferes with vigilance and focus.  
In O’Reilly’s (2010) What-How-Abstraction-Cold/Hot (WHACH) model, Hot 
emotional processing occurs in medial areas across the cortex.  These areas are directly 
connected to the limbic system while more lateral areas of the cortex, responsible for 
Cold cognition, are involved with sensory/motor processes.  Although O’Reilly’s 
indication could be characterized in other ways (e.g., Personal versus Impersonal), the 
Hot versus Cold template may add explanatory integration of scholarship on individual 
differences in thinking style (O’Hara & Sternberg, 2001), interest (Hennessey & Amabile, 
1998), problem-solving, and emotional regulation (Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008)—all of 
which are important for the study of creativity.  O’Reilly’s medial-lateral distinction, and 
its dichotic relation as an emotion regulation property, is especially relevant, however, for 
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findings on the association between creativity and mood disorders.  The lateral-medial 
distinction of hot versus cold cognition could explain how affective disorders, stemming 
from emotion dysregulation, interfere with working memory and facilitate the sort of 
emotional frenzy necessary for energy and productivity as well as the sort of diffuse 
attention necessary for divergent thinking. 
Preservative attention is an important topic in the emotional regulation literature 
as it is a hallmark characteristic of people who express greater interest and ability in 
creative endeavors (Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005).  In particular, depression is 
linked to heightened attention to feelings (Jamison, Gerner, Hammen, & Padesky, 1980), 
inner content (Richards, 1981), and deficits in the ability to screen out irrelevant stimuli 
(Carson, Peterson, Higgins, 2003).  According to Response Styles Theory (RST; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991) rumination	  “is a mode of responding to distress at involves repetitively 
and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and the possible causes and 
consequences of these symptoms”	  (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2003, p. 
400).  A key feature of rumination is perseveration on one’s feelings.  People who 
ruminate when upset are more likely to suffer through longer depressive episodes and are 
more likely to develop depressive disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Morrow & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994), and they are 
more likely to be creative (Verhaeghen et al., 2005). 
Creative People Procrastinate 
Rumination and procrastination findings from psychometric studies of creative 
interest and task engagement would seem to figure nicely into creativity theories 
concerning incubation, a process first conceived in Wallas’	  (1926) five-stage model 
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(preparation, incubation, intimation, illumination, verification) of the creative process.  
Incubation, defined as “a period away from deliberate work on the problem”	  (Hélie & 
Sun, 2010), has been found to lead to sudden insight for creative problem solving (p. 68). 
There are several theories of how incubations works (e.g.,  unconscious disinhibition, 
remote association, forgetting of irrelevant information; see Smith & Dodds, 1999 for a 
review) but unlike rumination theories, none of the incubation theories concern hedonic 
tone.  Furthermore, current theories of incubation encompass implicit and explicit 
processes (Hélie & Sun 2010) while most rumination studies only encompass explicitly 
effortful processes, especially since Cohen and Ferrari’s (2010) study demonstrated 
benefits of procrastination only in the presence of conscious thought.  Although 
incubation and rumination seem similar in many ways, especially with regard to the 
facilitation of creativity via periods of explicit or implicit reflection, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which these constructs may be meaningfully related or the same since they 
are derived from wholly separate research agendas.  Incubation studies have a long 
history of concern with creative problem solving while rumination studies began in the 
literature on risk factors for depression.  Only recently has rumination been a concern for 
creativity researchers.  
The Bright Side of Creativity 
Creative People Are Savvy  
 Anyone wanting to dispute Kaufman, Bromley, and Cole’s (2006) idea that 
creative people are deluded by romanticized ideas of madness would do well to consult 
Sternberg and Lubart’s (1991; 1992) investment theory of creativity, where social savvy 
and keen interpersonal awareness drive market-based valuations of worthwhile ideas.  
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According to their theory, a person is creative when six “resources”	  (intellectual 
processes, knowledge, intellectual style, personality, motivation, environmental context) 
converge to facilitate his or her ability to “buy low and sell high”	  in the world of ideas (p. 
1).  If eminently creative people and people with psychosis are similar in their tendency 
to think over-inclusively, as Eysenck (1993), among others, maintained, then perhaps a 
core differentiating factor between these populations is that creative achievers possess a 
meta-awareness of their ideas’	  appropriateness.   
  Sternberg and Lubart’s theory is rather intuitive and congruent with traditional 
creativity definitions offered in psychology.  In his inaugural address to the American 
Psychological Association (APA), Guilford (1950)’s oft-cited criteria for creativity 
continue to influence notions of novelty and usefulness.  He claimed that “degree[s] of 
novelty”	  could be measured by the statistical infrequency of ideas that are considered 
“acceptable”	  (p. 452).  Runco and Jaeger (2012) astutely concede that acceptability as a 
criterion introduces the problem of assigning the legitimate audience or judge.  
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) refers to the judges of appropriateness or value as gate-keepers 
who must be convinced to let ideas into a discursive domain.  
Creative People are Happy  
Alice Isen is perhaps the most widely regarded champion of the bright side 
creativity argument.    Her conclusion that happiness usually leads to creative cognitive 
processing is founded upon compelling experimental evidence.  She and her colleagues 
(Isen, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) induced positive mood in participants by complimenting 
their motor skill performance on an unrelated task.  On average, happy participants made 
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decisions four times faster than a control group.  Happy participants made faster 
decisions because they used less information and because they rechecked their choices 
less often.  Isen and Daubman (1984) concluded that these results support the idea that 
positive affect facilitates data reduction through the use of broader categories.  And 
because broader categories are more inclusive and complex than narrow categories, Isen 
and Daubman concluded,  “the cognitive context present when a person is happy may be 
more complex”	  (p. 1207).  The benefits of data reduction have been alluded to in other 
areas of psychology.  As early as 1880, William James remarked that wisdom is 
punctuated by knowledge of what to overlook.  In his essay on great men and their 
environments, the marksman attends to the motion of the wind but not the motion of the 
earth and solar system.  Happy people may be more likely to overlook more information 
than people in neutral or sad moods because they are less likely to make close 
discriminations about all available data.  
Murray and his colleagues (Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990) investigated the 
influence of goals on mood.  They found that participants in a positive mood induction 
group made fewer and more inclusive categories than neutral and induced negative mood 
groups when they were instructed to find similarities between popular television shows.  
Positive mood participants were also able to generate more categories between popular 
television shows than other participants when they were instructed to find differences.  
Furthermore, they found that intrinsic interest in the task mediated the relationship 
between positive mood and cognitive flexibility.  Murray et al. therefore concluded that 
positive mood might facilitate cognitive processing that is optimal for creative thinking as 
well as increased productivity through greater effort expenditure.  
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Creative People are Highly Motivated 
 De Dreu et al.’s (2008) dual pathway model to creativity stipulates that positive 
and negative moods must be activating in order to lead to creativity.  Harmon-Jones and 
his colleagues (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2013) use the term motivational intensity 
to refer to the degree to which moods facilitate an approach urge.  They note that low 
motivational intensity is most often found in moods (such as satisfaction or gratitude) that 
occur after goals have been accomplished while high motivational intensity is found in 
moods (such as desire or enthusiasm) that occur before goals have been reached.  They 
argued that most positive mood experimenters have not made this distinction in their 
methods and have only examined positive moods with low motivational intensity.  
Because of this, Harmon-Jones et al. contend that it is low motivational intensity rather 
than positive mood that accounts for broader attentional scope.  Using a local-globe scope 
task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982), Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008) found that participants 
made more local categorizations after they watched a film intended to induce low 
motivational intensity and that they made more global categorizations after they watched 
a film intended to induce high motivational intensity.  The researchers used a film of 
kittens in funny situations for the low motivational intensity induction procedure because 
they wanted to induce general positive affect.  They used a film of appealing desserts for 
the high motivational intensity induction because it was indicative of a specific, 
appetitive stimulus or valued goal.    
Dual Pathway to Creativity Model 
The dual pathway to creativity model (DeDreu, Bass, & Nijstad, 2008) explains 
how dark side and bright side accounts of creativity may both be correct.  According to 
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their model, positive moods lead to originality and fluency, two widely used indicators of 
creativity (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999), by enhancing cognitive flexibility.  On the other 
hand, negative moods enhance creativity by motivating persistence.  The model was 
borne from the cognitive tuning model (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994) where 
negative moods inform a person that a problem needs to be solved and positive moods 
inform a person that a situation is safe.  As such, a person in a negative mood is more 
likely to engage in repeated efforts to address a particular problem.  People suffering 
from depression are indeed more likely to experience a problem-finding orientation 
(Mraz & Runco, 1994) and a tendency to perseverate (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  
According to the cognitive tuning model, positive moods inform a person that a situation 
is safe, and this may explain why people expend less effort making complex decisions 
(Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982), take more risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983), and 
explore novel uses for everyday objects (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987) when they 
experience positive moods.    
 As creative artists are at an increased risk for bipolar disorder (Rybakowski & 
Klonowska, 2010) and they experience higher incidences of emotional sensitivity (Feist, 
1998, Kaufman & Baer, 2002), could it be the case that artists benefit from the adaptive 
effects of negative and positive affects by virtue of increased affective lability? Reinders’	  
(1991) account of artist self-report indicates a commonly held perception among artists 
that the creative process is facilitated by a distance-engagement paradox.’	  
phenomenological investigation supports the lay notion among artists and creative writers 
that they must first enter a disinhibited state where they generate many ideas without 
judgment (e.g., a drafting stage).  This state is facilitated by enthusiasm and approach 
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motivation.  After generating creative ideas through loose association and disinhibition, 
writers and artists may refine their works with disengaged evaluations of quality.  The 
intentional back-and-forth process of distance and engagement may correlate with 
affective lability, a risk factor for affective disorders.  Future studies may be used to 
investigate mood changes over time as creative professionals distance themselves from or 
engage with their creative products. 
Rumination 
Owing to its origins in studies on depression, the concept of rumination is 
primarily used to account for the negative mood route to creativity (Cohen & Ferrari, 
2010; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005).  Nolen-Hoeksema (1991; 2000, 2004a, 
2004b) introduced Response Styles Theory (RST) to hypothesize that individual 
differences in the onset and maintenance of depression depend on the way in which 
people respond to negative moods.  Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) defined depressive 
rumination as “passively and repetitively focusing on one’s symptoms of distress and the 
circumstances surrounding these symptoms”	  (p. 569).  Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s 
(1991) Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) measures the extent to which people engage 
in rumination.  Treynor and his colleagues (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003) conducted a psychometric study of the RRS in an attempt to differentiate 
rumination from depression.  They found three factors with items indicative of different 
implications for mood.  They labeled the factors depressive, brooding, and reflective 
ponding according to the feelings that seemed to be associated with them.  Rumination 
scores on the RRS account for the 2:1 ratio of female to male depression rates (Butler & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Grant et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999), 
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predict onset of depression in previously non-depressed people (Just & Alloy, 1997; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and predict depressive symptoms in patients with clinical 
depression after controlling for baseline depression symptoms (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rohan, Sigmon, & Dorhofer, 2003). 
Other researchers have focused on the particularities of rumination as a cognitive 
process rather than on the mood types that rumination styles are likely to evoke.  Martin 
and Tesser (1996) defined rumination as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve 
around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate 
demands requiring the thought”	  (p. 7).  From this perspective, rumination is conceived as 
repetitive, passive thought that may be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on whether or 
not it leads to positive or negative consequences.  Cohen and Ferrari (2010) found that 
higher scores on reflective RRS items predicted higher scores on a measure of creative 
ideation (Runco Ideational Behavior Scale, RRS; Runco, Plucker, & Lim; 2001) in the 
presence of high levels of indecision.  Their findings support Martin and Tesser’s (1996) 
notion that different styles of rumination may be more or less adaptive.  Given the 
nascence of rumination investigations of creativity, Cohen and Ferrari did not offer 
explanations for why reflective rumination enhances creativity.  Furthermore, their study 
did not include a measure of rumination as a response to positive mood.   
Although rumination research explains individual differences in depression and it 
explains why higher incidences of depression are found in creative professionals, it does 
not explain differences in cognitive process elements between rumination styles.  RST 
does not describe rumination as an affective style, but Treynor et al. (2003) differentiated 
RRS subscales according to the affective tone that seemed to be associated with them.  
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But why should a reflective style increase creative ideation while a brooding style does 
not?  It could be the case that a reflective style only indirectly influences productivity—
and not creativity, per se—by limiting symptoms of depression such as fatigue or low 
motivation (Weisberg, 1994).  Or it might rather be the case that a reflective style is 
adaptive for making meaning of experience since it is characterized by evaluative “cold 
cognition”	  (O’Reilly, 2010).  In the next section, I present a construal-level theory of 
psychological distance (CLT; see Liberman & Trope, 2008 for a review) account of 
rumination styles differences and their impact on creativity.  I make a case that a self-
distant perspective—characterized by low physiological arousal and abstract thinking—
facilitates creativity when people respond to negative moods because it reduces 
depressive symptoms and enhances a cognitive bias toward making sense of experience.  
A self-immersed perspective, as a response to positive mood, is adaptive for creativity 
because it enhances interest, productivity, and cognitive flexibility. 
Narrative Point of View and Psychological Distance 
 Markus and Kitayama (1991) originally introduced the self-construal to explain 
differences in the ways that Japanese and Americans understand themselves and value 
individualist versus collectivist goals (see Cross, Hardin, and Gercek-Swing, 2011 for a 
review of self-construal), but the construct has since grown in relevance for examinations 
of group differences in other research domains.  Hardin and Lakin’s (2008) Integrated 
Self-Discrepancy Index (ISDI) operationalizes self-construal as the self-rated 
dissimilarity scores for ideal-self (e.g., “the way I would like to be versus the way I really 
am”) and ought-self (e.g., “the way I ought to be versus the way I really am”) from one’s 
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own perspective or the imagined perspective of a significant other.  Hardin and Lakin 
(2008) found that ideal-self discrepancies were positively correlated with depression 
scores.  Although the ISDI and self-construal theories have not been widely used in 
studies of creativity, the idea that multiple self-perspectives explain how people make 
sense of their lives is a popular notion in narrative psychological research (Hermans, 
2001, 2003; McAdams, 2006; Raggatt, 2006; Pals, 2006).   
In our Q-methodological (Stephenson, 1953) investigation (Copeland & Knight, 
2008), we instructed a creative writer to perform Q-sorts for her third-person self, her 
first-person self, and the names of five fictional characters that she generated for a series 
of short stories that she wrote on a weekly basis for four weeks.  Before Q-sorts were 
performed, we described essential differences between first-person self and third-person 
self by informing the participant about ways in which researchers have conceptualized 
multiple selves (Brewer, 2012, 1991).  We described the first-person self as the self that 
is aware of the ongoing present, and we described the third-person self as the self that 
makes judgments and meaning about these experiences across time and space.  We found 
that the participant’s protagonists most often loaded a factor with her first-person self 
while antagonists loaded onto a factor with her third-person self.  From this finding in 
particular, we concluded that empathy and engagement may be related to perceived 
closeness in perspective.  A third-person narrative perspective may be considered distant 
because its omniscience lends itself to abstractions while a first-person perspective may 
be considered close because it is particular to experiences from a specifically singular 
point of view.   
  61 
Our first-person and third-person dichotomy was especially informed by William 
James’	  (1890/2007) proposal that the self is experienced from a subjective-me (or self-as 
known) perspective and an objective-I (or self-as knower) point of view.  James used 
these concepts to explain how personal identity is a consequence of perceived continuity 
of self through time and space.  I is able to consider, consolidate, and make sense of me 
elements such as distant memories and distant belongings.  By analogy, I is more distant 
from specific times and places than me because I makes appraisals of the aspects of me 
that have been experienced in the past or that are anticipated in the future.  To illustrate, 
if one were asked to imagine herself eating dinner yesterday, she may visually imagine 
herself eating from a third-person point of view—a perspective outside her body.  This 
third-person, distanced perspective is the appraising I.  The imagined self who eats dinner 
that the I watches is me.  Similar multiple-self theories are found in Dennett’s (1991) 
work, where the self is described as a “center of narrative gravity”	  (p. 410) and in 
Bakhtin’s (1930/1998) work where a self emerges from a dynamic polyphony of I-
positions.  
 In construal-level theory (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 2008), self-perspectives differ 
according to differences in psychological distance.  The concept of psychological 
distance was originally used to explain mixed findings on the effect of thinking about bad 
memories.  While some research findings demonstrate therapeutic benefits for thinking 
about bad memories (Pennebaker, 1997; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008), others demonstrate 
increased risks of ruminative entanglement and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991).  Kross and Ayduk (2011) reviewed evidence showing that participants experience 
less physiological and emotional distress when they recall bad memories from the 
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viewpoint of a “fly on the way”	  (self-distanced perspective) versus a first-person 
perspective (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 
2005).  Because self-distance is associated with reconstrual rather than recounting of 
experience, a self-distanced perspective, in response to negative mood, may help people 
make sense of their lives.  A self-distanced perspective may explain why people who 
ruminate reflectively as a response to negative mood experience less symptoms of 
depression.  And because a self-distanced perspective is associated with an ability to 
make sense of experience, it might also explain why reflective rumination is associated 
with increased creative ideation. 
 Rumination theorists often differentiate rumination effects according to the 
positive or negative valence that different styles are likely to elicit.  For instance, in their 
psychometric study of the Rumination Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), researchers (Treynor, Gonzalez, &Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) found three 
factors and labeled them depressive, brooding, and reflective.  Their characterization is a 
bit misleading, however, since rumination is defined by its style of passive and repetitive 
focus rather than its affective tone (Martin & Tesser, 1996).  Cohen and Ferrari (2010) 
found that reflective rumination, a style typified by neutral affective valence predicted 
creative ideational behavior (Runco, Plucker, & Lim, 2001) in the presence of high levels 
of indecision.  While investigators like Cohen and Ferrari are concerned with the 
moderating effects of indecision on the relationship between creativity and mood, Kross 
and Ayduk (2011) are concerned with the ways in which psychological distance informs 
appraisal and consequent mood states.  Unfortunately, Kross and Ayduk do not 
differentiate between affective rumination styles, taking it for granted that the term 
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rumination is an umbrella term for depressive ideation that is always a risk factor for 
depression while self-reflection is necessarily a different construct.  This is probably the 
result of the negative connotation that rumination has received due to the way that it has 
been characterized in the depression literature. 
In the context of creativity investigations, rumination models are themselves a 
recounting of experience in that the presence and quality of rumination provides a 
prediction or explanation of links between variables.  A CLT account of psychological 
distance may present a higher-order approach (Dennett 1978) because it construes 
rumination models with causal roles for mental states and conscious intent from goals.  In 
other words, CLT theory provides an explanation how and why rumination styles exert 
different effects on creative ideation.  Beginning explorations of rumination as a response 
to negative affect indicate that a reflective pondering style is particularly useful for 
enhancing creativity.  Questions remain about how reflective pondering works.  Based on 
CLT theories of psychological distance, I hypothesize that reflective pondering enhances 
creativity by facilitating a cognitive bias toward abstract thinking, persistence within a 
single domain, a problem-finding orientation, and a consequent reduction of debilitating 
depressive symptoms.  This explanation describes the negative mood pathway to 
creativity via De Dreu et al.’s (2008) dual-pathway model.  To my knowledge, no 
rumination theories are used to describe the positive mood pathway to creativity.  One 
measure of ruminative response to positive affect, the Responses to Positive Affect 
(RPA; Feldman, Joormann, & Johnson, 2008) has been used to predict manic symptoms.  
A self-immersed ruminative response to positive mood may be adaptive for creativity 
because it facilitates a cognitive bias toward alternative perspective taking, increased 
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physiological and emotional approach motivation, and increased interest in creative 
pursuits. 
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH STUDY MATERIALS 
SOLICITATION OF PARTICIPATION 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this study is to investigate mood and creativity. 
 
Description:  As a participant, you will be asked to respond to several questions regarding 
your thoughts and practices about your feelings and creative thinking.  You will also be 
asked to respond to some demographic questions. 
 
Duration:  15 minutes  
 
 
Researchers:  Chris Copeland, M.S., M.A., christopher.copeland@okstate.edu  
 Sue Jacobs, Ph.D., sue.c.jacobs@okstate.edu 
Steve Harrist, Ph.D., steve.harrist@okstate.edu  
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INFORMED CONSENT 
Project Title:  Mood and Creativity 
 
Investigators: Chris Copeland, M.S., M.A., Steve Harrist, Ph.D., Sue Jacobs, Ph.D., 
School of Applied Health and Educational Psychology, Oklahoma State University 
(OSU) 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate mood and creativity. 
 
Procedures: Participants over 18 years of age will be asked to complete an online survey 
questionnaire one time and provide demographic information. This study will take about 
15 minutes. 
 
Risks of Participation: There are no known risks associated with this project that are 
greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. 
 
Benefits: This study may allow researchers to introduce positive rumination, as opposed 
to only neutral and negative types introduced in current research, as a possible predictor 
of creativity. 
 
Confidentiality: Confidentiality of each participant will be enforced. Although instructors 
may be advised when a student has participated, they will not have access to a student's 
actual survey or information collected through the survey. Information will be stored on a 
secure database using the survey instrument software (such as Survey Monkey) and will 
only be accessible by researchers of this study. Any identifying information in order to 
assess participation for course credit will be removed before data is analyzed and any 
results are reported.  
 
Research records will be stored securely on a password-protected file of the Principal 
Investigator’s computer, and no one other than PI and advisers will have any access to the 
data obtained. Electronic data files will be destroyed five years after the completion of 
the research study.  Any written results will discuss group findings. 
 
Compensation:  Student participants who are registered with and referred from the 
College of Education’s SONA system (http://education.okstate.edu/sona) can earn 0.5 
course credits for completing this survey, which will take about 15 minutes to complete. 
SONA-referred students who choose not to participate in the research study will be asked 
to complete alternative assignments to get equal extra credits.  Participants not registered 
with and referred from the OSU College of Education’s SONA website will not receive 
course credit or any other form of compensation for completing this survey. 
 
Contacts: Subject may contact the following researcher with questions about the research: 
Chris Copeland (Principal Investigator), 405-620-7218, 408 Willard Hall, School of 
Applied Health and Educational Psychology, Oklahoma State University, 
christopher.copeland@okstate.edu 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research volunteer, you may contact Dr. 
Shelia Kennison, IRB Chair, 219 Cordell North, Stillwater, OK 74078, 405-744-3377 or 
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irb@okstate.edu. 
 
 
Participant Rights: Participation is voluntary and subjects can discontinue the research 
activity at any time without reprisal or penalty. There are no risks to subjects who might 
withdraw.  
 
If you choose to participate: Please, click NEXT if you choose to participate. By 
clicking NEXT, you are indicating that you freely and voluntarily and agree to participate 
in this study and you also acknowledge that you are at least 18 years of age.   
It is recommended that you print a copy of this consent page for your records before you 
begin the study by clicking below. 
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DECISIONAL PROCRASTINATION SCALE 
 
Instructions:  People differ in how they go about making decisions.  Please indicate how 
you make decisions by selecting the response from 1 (low) to 5 (high) to each question 
that best fits your usual style. 
 
1 = Not true for me 
2 = Often untrue for me 
3 = Sometimes true/false for me 
4 = Often true for me 
5 = True for me 
  
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. 
2. Even after I have made a decision I delay acting upon it. 
3. I don’t make decisions unless I really have to. 
4. I delay making decisions until it’s too late. 
5. I put off making decisions 
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RUNCO IDEATIONAL BEHAVIOR SCALE 
 
Instructions:  Use the 0-4 scale (given below) to describe your thinking and behavior.  
You may need to approximate.  Please indicate how you really think and behave, not how 
you think you should.  Remember—no names are used.  Your responses are confidential.  
Again, you may need to approximate.  For each item, circle the response option that is the 
closest to being accurate. 
 
0 = never 1 = seldom 2 = sometimes  3 = often 4 = very often 
 
1. I have many wild ideas. 
2. I think about ideas more often than most people. 
3. I often get excited by my own new ideas. 
4. I come up with a lot of ideas or solutions to problems. 
5. I come up with an idea or solution other people have never thought of. 
6. I like to play around with ideas for the fun of it. 
7. It is important to be able to think of bizarre and wild possibilities. 
8. I would rate myself highly in being able to come up with ideas. 
9. I have always been an active thinker and I have lots of ideas. 
10. I enjoy having leeway in the things I do and room to make up my own mind. 
11. My ideas are often considered “impractical”	  or even “wild.” 
12. I would take a college course that was based on original ideas. 
13. I am able to think about things intensely for many hours. 
14. Sometimes I get so interested in a new idea that I forget about other things that I  
should be doing. 
15. I often have trouble sleeping at night, because so many ideas keep popping into my   
  head. 
16. When writing papers or talking to people, I often have trouble staying with one topic  
  because I think of so many things to write or say. 
17. I often find that one of my ideas has led me to other ideas that have led me to other  
  ideas, and I end up with an idea and do not know where it came from. 
18. Some people might think me scatterbrained or absentminded because I think about a  
  variety of things at once. 
19. I try to exercise my mind by thinking things through. 
20. I am able to think up answers to problems that haven’t already been figured out. 
21. I am good at combining ideas in ways that others have not tried. 
22. Friends ask me to help them think of ideas and solutions. 
23. I have ideas about new inventions or about how to improve things. 
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RUMINATION REPONSES SCALE 
 
Instructions:  People think and do many different things when they feel depressed.  Please 
read each of the items below and indicate whether you almost, never, sometimes, often, 
or almost always think or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed.  Please 
indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
1 = almost never  2 = sometimes  3 = often  4 = almost always 
 
1. think “What am I doing to deserve this?”     Brooding 
2. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed Reflective 
3. think “Why do I always react this way?”     Brooding 
4. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  Reflective 
5. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it   Reflective 
6. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  Brooding 
7. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  Brooding 
8. think “Why can’t I handle things better?”    Brooding 
9. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed Reflective 
10. go someplace alone to think about your feelings    Reflective 
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POSITIVE RUMINATION SCALE 
 
Instructions:  People think and do many different things when they feel happy.  Please 
read each of the items below and indicate whether you almost, never, sometimes, often, 
or almost always think or do each one when you feel upbeat, happy, or enthusiastic.  
Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
1 = almost never  2 = sometimes  3 = often 4 = almost always 
 
1. think “I deserve to feel good about myself.”    Basking 
2. think “I am proud of my actions.”      Basking 
3. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are happy  Interpreting 
4. take some time alone to reflect on why you feel good   Interpreting 
5. think about a recent situation, appreciating how well it went  Basking 
6. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are happy Interpreting 
7. think “I do not have problems other people have.”   Basking 
8. think “I am handling things well.”      Basking 
9. take some time alone to reflect on your feelings of well-being   Interpreting 
10. write down positive thoughts and analyze them    Interpreting 
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DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONS 
 
1. What is your race 
a. White 
b. Black 
c. Asian or Pacific Islander 
d. American Indian 
e. Mixed Race 
f. Other 
g. Prefer not to Respond 
2. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other 
d. Prefer not to respond 
3. What is your age? 
a. 18-28 
b. 29-39 
c. 40-50 
d. 51-61 
e. 62-72 
f. 73-83 
g. 94-104 
h. Prefer not to respond 
4. What is your classification? 
a. Freshman 
b. Sophomore 
c. Junior 
d. Senior 
e. Other 
f. Prefer not to respond 
5. What is your highest degree completed? 
a. High School degree 
b. Associates degree 
c. Bachelors degree 
d. Masters degree 
e. Doctoral degree 
f. Other 
g. Prefer not to respond 
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6. From which college are you seeking a degree? 
a. Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources 
b. Arts and Sciences 
c. Education 
d. Engineering, Architecture, and Technology 
e. Human Sciences 
f. Spears School of Business 
g. Center for Veterinary Health Sciences 
h. Graduate College 
i. Honors College 
j. College of Osteopathic Medicine 
k. Prefer not to respond 
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